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INTRODUCTION 
Empirical studies of judicial behavior are becoming 
increasingly common and sophisticated.1 These studies typically 
draw upon large databases of opinions and employ quantitative 
analytic techniques in an attempt to measure the influence of 
various factors in judicial decision-making.2 A focus of particular 
attention in many of these studies is the role played by political 
ideology. For example, Cass Sunstein and several colleagues 
examine this issue at length in a 2006 book aptly entitled Are Judges 
Political?3 Like many other scholars, Sunstein and his coauthors find 
that political ideology does indeed have an effect on judicial 
decisions—at least in some cases, and at least to some degree.4 
Other empirical studies have concentrated their attention on the 
influence of ideology in specific doctrinal areas. Gregory Sisk and 
Michael Heise have published a series of articles focusing on 
religious liberty cases in the federal courts and have reported a 
range of results. While Sisk and Heise find that political ideology 
does not play a significant explanatory role in Free Exercise Clause 
 
 1. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Some Thoughts on the Study of Judicial Behavior, 57 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 2017 (2016) (discussing evolution of theoretical and empirical studies of judicial 
decision-making in various disciplines); Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and the 
Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 874 
(2008) (“Within just a few short years, empirical study of the law in general, and in particular 
of the courts, has risen to a level of prominence in American law schools.”). 
 2. See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2007) 
(analyzing some 18,000 federal appellate cases from 1925 to 1992); LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. 
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013) (applying regression and correlation analysis 
to datasets of decisions from all levels of federal judiciary).  
 3. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE 
JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006). 
 4. Id. at 148–49 (finding “significant splits between Republican and Democratic 
appointees on the great legal issues of the day” overall, while also finding that “in some 
controversial areas, the political affiliation of the appointing president is not correlated with 
judicial votes”); see also EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 385 (“[I]deology influences judicial 
decisions at all levels of the federal judiciary . . . [but] it does not extinguish the influence of 
conventional principles of judicial decision-making . . . .”); CROSS, supra note 2, at 7 (“Judges 
appointed by more conservative presidents consistently produce more conservative 
opinions on the bench . . . [but] this effect varies considerably over time and by the type of 
case under review.”). 
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cases,5 they find that “[t]he powerful role of political factors . . . 
appears undeniable and substantial” in Establishment Clause 
cases.6 Similarly, in the context of education, Sisk and Heise 
conclude that “Republican-appointed judges were more likely than 
their Democratic-appointed counterparts to reach a pro-religion 
decision in school cases.”7 
There is thus a significant body of existing scholarly literature 
exploring the influence of ideology on judicial decision-making in 
general and on religion cases in particular. The present Article 
makes a novel contribution to that literature by exploring a  
related but distinct issue. Rather than analyzing religion as a 
category of cases that is subject to ideological influence, we focus 
on religion as a category of ideology that has the potential to exert 
its own influence. 
Several key elements distinguish our approach. First, we seek 
to measure the role of religion in a broad range of cases in which 
various forms of ideological influence might be expected to 
manifest themselves. In other words, we do not limit our 
examination of religious influence to cases that present religious 
liberty issues. Second, whereas some studies have included religion 
among other variables when examining the role of political 
ideology in decision-making,8 our emphasis is on the role of 
religion as such. We accordingly offer a much more detailed 
discussion of the relationship between religious identification and 
outcomes, and the ways in which this relationship may differ with 
respect to various religious denominations and traditions. Third, 
rather than looking at the independent effects of different 
ideological influences, we employ more complex econometric 
techniques to understand how political ideology measured several 
different ways may interact with religious ideology in influencing 
voting behavior in specific types of cases. We therefore offer more 
textured results of the complex relationships among political 
 
 5. Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Free Exercise of Religion Before the Bench: Empirical 
Evidence from the Federal Courts, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1371, 1374 (2013). 
 6. Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”? An Empirical Study 
of Establishment Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1204 (2012). 
 7. Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Religion, Schools, and Judicial Decision Making: An 
Empirical Perspective, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 185, 189 (2012). 
 8. See, e.g., Heise & Sisk, supra note 5; Sisk & Heise, supra note 6; Heise & Sisk, supra 
note 7. 
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ideology, religious identification, and different substantive areas of 
the law. We are able to say more not only about the interactions 
between political ideology and religion but about how they operate 
differently in different substantive contexts, such as cases in which 
fundamental moral values are at issue. Finally, while most previous 
studies have employed comparison of means or regression with 
only main effects, we marshal more sophisticated econometric and 
visual methodologies to analyze and understand the empirical 
patterns in the data. We are therefore able to provide more nuanced 
and (hopefully) more transparent insight into the nature of the 
effects of political ideology and religion on voting behavior of 
judges. 
The Article is organized as follows. Part I discusses the 
motivation for studying the influence of religion on judicial 
decision-making. Part II summarizes the data, and Part III explains 
our methodology. Part IV discusses the results of our analysis. Our 
main finding is that in cases in which fundamental moral values9 
are at stake, and almost exclusively in those cases, both religion and 
political ideology matter—and they matter differently for different 
religious groups. In these moral values cases, a divergence in 
behavior arises in which Protestant judges seem to be voting 
liberally or conservatively in line with their political ideology, 
while Catholic judges seem to be voting relatively conservatively 
regardless of their political ideology. The Article concludes with 
some observations about the possible implications of our findings 
for future nomination debates, confirmation hearings, and public 
discourse about the judiciary. 
I. WHY ANALYZE RELIGION? 
Individualized illustrations of the influence of religion on 
judicial behavior can occasionally be found in case law or media 
reports. Perhaps most famously, the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals heard a case in which a former chief justice of the Alabama 
Supreme Court placed a two-and-a-half ton Ten Commandments 
 
 9. Moral values cases include those involving abortion, obscenity, gay and lesbian 
rights, and capital punishment. We include these kinds of cases because of the frequency 
with which they are cast in moral or religious terms in public discourse. For further 
discussion of case categories, see infra Section II.A. 
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monument in the rotunda of the state judicial building.10 In holding 
that the display violated the Establishment Clause, the court 
indicated that the justice had installed the monument “in order to 
remind all Alabama citizens of . . . his belief in the sovereignty of 
the Judeo-Christian God over both the state and the church.”11 
Another federal appellate case involved a North Carolina state 
judge who began morning sessions of court by reciting a prayer 
aloud.12 More recently, a state court judge in Texas reportedly 
asked jurors to return a verdict of not guilty, explaining that “when 
God tells me I gotta do something, I gotta do it.”13 
But while cases like these may attract public attention, they do 
not provide the primary motivation for the instant analysis. Such 
explicit invocations of religion by judges acting in an official 
capacity are notable in part because they are rare; few serious 
observers would regard them as representative of larger trends in 
judicial behavior. Rather, our motivation arises out of broader 
discussions in the literature about more subtle influences of religion 
in judicial decision-making—especially in cases implicating 
fundamental rights and moral values, or in which the law is unclear 
or unsettled. 
Some have argued that judges should be able to rely on 
religious reasoning to the same extent that they are able to rely on 
other forms of moral reasoning when deciding such cases,14 while 
others have maintained that judges should instead draw upon 
 
 10. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 11. Id. 
 12. North Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal Found. v. Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145, 
1146–47, 1152 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that the prayer at issue violated the 
Establishment Clause). 
 13. Ryan Autullo, Texas Judge Interrupts Jury, Says God Told Him Defendant Is Not Guilty, 
STATESMAN (Jan. 20, 2018, 12:01 AM), https://www.statesman.com/news/20180120/Texas 
-judge-interrupts-jury-says-god-told-him-defendant-is-not-guilty. 
 14. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL 
PERSPECTIVES 102–04 (1997) (when making a choice about “underdeterminate” legal 
materials, judges may rely upon a religious premise if a plausible secular premise also 
supports the choice); Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
932, 943 (1989) (“[I]f religious conviction plays a role at all, it would enter into the deliberative 
process, but not the process of justification . . . . [Judges] might make decisions on the basis 
of moral conviction, but they must justify them in terms of the received norms of judging.”). 
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“public reasons” or commonly held political premises and values.15 
Popular and academic interest in issues of this sort became 
particularly pronounced with the emergence of a Roman Catholic 
majority on the U.S. Supreme Court in 2006.16 A number of scholars 
addressed questions about the potential relationship between 
Catholic doctrine and judicial decision-making, with several 
articles emphasizing the paucity of explicit church teaching on the 
judicial role and on constitutional interpretation.17 But another 
article argued that Catholic teaching has long maintained that 
public actors have an obligation to seek conformity between moral 
law and civil law when fundamental rights are at issue;18 the article 
further argued that judges often play a sufficiently robust 
lawmaking role to be included in this teaching.19 Catholic doctrine 
may thus be interpreted to imply that in at least some 
circumstances, “[t]he Supreme Court’s judgment about the 
application of the Constitution should . . . be guided by the 
principles of the moral law.”20 
Yet even if religious teachings do imply that certain cases 
should be decided in certain ways, it cannot be assumed that 
 
 15. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 141–49 
(1995) ([T]he basic reason for preferring some premises and ways of reasoning over other is 
that they are shared in our political culture . . . . [S]o I believe reliance on some kinds of moral 
and political philosophy is easier to justify for judges than reliance on their own religious 
beliefs.”); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 213–16 (1993) (arguing that public actors and 
supreme court judges in particular should justify decisions in terms of “the ideals and 
principles expressed by society’s conception of political justice”). 
 16. See, e.g., René Reyes, The Supreme Court’s Catholic Majority: Doctrine, Discretion, and 
Judicial Decision-Making, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 649 (2011); William H. Pryor, Jr., The Religious 
Faith and Judicial Duty of an American Catholic Judge, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 347 (2006). 
 17. See Scott C. Idleman, Private Conscience, Public Duties: The Unavoidable Conflicts 
Facing a Catholic Justice, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 312, 315 (2006) (“[T]here are few if any 
authoritative church documents that speak directly to, or clearly about, a judge’s specific 
obligations.”); Gregory A. Kalscheur, Catholics in Public Life: Judges, Legislators, and Voters, 46 
J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 211, 229 (2007) (“There is no official Church teaching that defines what 
the U.S. Constitution means. Indeed, such a question is beyond the competence of the 
Church’s teaching office.”). 
 18. See Reyes, supra note 16, at 653–62 (reviewing Catholic teaching on law, morality, 
and public life). 
 19. Id. at 662–73 (considering applicability of Catholic teaching to judges). 
 20. William J. Levada, Theological Reflections on Catholics in Political Life and the Reception 
of Holy Communion, U.S. CONF. CATH. BISHOPS (June 13, 2004), http://www.usccb.org/issues 
-and-action/faithful-citizenship/church-teaching/theological-reflections-tf-bishops-politi 
cians-2004-06-13.cfm; see also Reyes, supra note 16, at 667–68 (discussing Levada’s argument); 
Kalscheur, supra note 17, at 229 n.48 (discussing same). 
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religious judges will necessarily act in accordance with those 
teachings.21 Nor have exchanges between Senators and judicial 
nominees on the subject of religious influences on judging been 
particularly illuminating. In response to questions about separation 
of church and state during his confirmation hearings, Chief Justice 
John Roberts stated, “my faith and my religious beliefs do not play 
a role in judging. When it comes to judging, I look to the law books 
and always have.”22 In a similar vein, Justice Samuel Alito 
answered a query about the role of religion and morality in judging 
by explaining that “my obligation as a judge is to interpret and 
apply the Constitution and the laws of the United States, and not 
my personal religious beliefs or any personal moral beliefs that I 
have, and there is nothing about my religious beliefs that interferes 
with my doing that.“23 Such responses appear to be in keeping  
with the general trend among recent nominees of revealing very 
little about the substance of their judicial philosophies, and of 
portraying the decision-making process as the application of “law 
all the way down.”24 
In sum, both the academic literature and the judicial 
confirmation process have raised ample questions about the role 
that religion should play in judicial decision-making. No doubt 
such questions will persist at the level of theory and politics for 
years to come. The aim of this Article is to move beyond these 
jurisprudential and theoretical debates and to provide a rigorous 
empirical assessment of some of the issues they raise. Thus, instead 
of reflecting on what judges ought to do or speculating about what 
 
 21. See Reyes, supra note 16, at 680–81 (noting diversity of jurisprudential approaches 
among Catholic judges and emphasizing limited utility of Catholic self-identification as a 
predictor of judicial behavior); see also John T. Noonan, Jr., The Religion of the Justice: Does It 
Affect Constitutional Decision Making?, 42 TULSA L. REV. 761, 768 (2013) (“Religion . . . does not 
regularly predict how a judge will vote on a constitutional question. It does not furnish an 
explanation of how the judge voted. It does not regularly distinguish the judge from 
colleagues who do not share his religious beliefs.”). 
 22. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the 
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 227 (2005). 
 23. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 566–67 (2006). 
 24. The Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 103 (2010); see also Sisk 
& Heise, supra note 6, at 1202–04 (discussing Justice Kagan’s statement). 
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they might do when deciding cases that leave open a role for 
religious or moral influences, we look at what judges actually do. 
Throughout our analysis, Catholicism and Catholic judges 
occasionally receive particular attention. This is so for a few 
reasons. For one, the hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church 
makes it possible to identify “official” or authoritative teaching 
with greater clarity than is possible for many other religious 
traditions.25 The Catholic Church’s long practice of bringing this 
teaching to bear on questions relating to religion and public life 
may also distinguish it from some other faith communities.26 In 
addition, Catholic doctrine also highlights the fact that the 
teachings of a single religious tradition may not all fit within a 
single ideological category: some Catholic positions (such as 
opposition to the death penalty) are thought to be more liberal, 
while others (such as opposition to abortion) are regarded as more 
conservative.27 This absence of complete congruence between 
religious ideology and political ideology has the potential to help 
isolate and measure the effect of each form of influence. To be sure, 
some of these attributes are not unique to Catholicism, and we 
apply our analysis to judges identified with a range of religions. 
More details about the data and methods behind this analysis are 
set forth in the next sections. 
II. DATA 
A. Case Data 
The number of judges at different levels of the judiciary can 
pose challenges for empirical analysis. At the state level, there are 
some 30,000 trial and appellate judges—a number far too large to 
 
 25. See Reyes, supra note 16, at 656 n.34 (discussing hierarchy and teaching authority 
of the Catholic Church); see also CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 85 (2d ed. 1997) 
(“[T]he task of interpretation has been entrusted to the bishops in communion with the 
successor of Peter, the Bishop of Rome.”). 
 26. See Reyes, supra note 16, at 678; see also Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of 
Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1047, 1071 
(1990) (suggesting that with respect to issues like the relationship between natural law and 
positive law, “[o]ne might be more likely to ask Roman Catholic nominees such questions 
than, say, Lutherans, because the Catholic Church has historically insisted on the reality of 
natural law in a way that the Lutheran community has not”). 
 27. See Reyes, supra note 16, at 680–81. 
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manage for present purposes.28 At the other end of the spectrum, 
there are only nine U.S. Supreme Court Justices on the bench at a 
given time—a number much too small to provide for statistically 
significant analysis. Any study must therefore make choices about 
which judges and which opinions to focus upon. Following the 
practice and relying on the data used by Sunstein, Schkade, Ellman, 
and Sawicki,29 the analysis we present in this Article focuses on the 
behavior of judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeal. The data consist 
of a set of federal appellate cases with published opinions from 
1980 to 2004. These cases were coded by Sunstein and his coauthors 
for their study on the role of political ideology in judicial decision-
making, and we follow the conventions established by those 
authors.30 Decisions are coded as one for a liberal decision and zero 
for a conservative decision. Given that judicial opinions do not 
come pre-labeled as liberal or conservative, the process of coding 
involves some degree of subjective judgment and imprecision.31 
Nevertheless, most judgments should be fairly noncontroversial 
—a judge’s vote counts as liberal, for example, “if it upholds an 
affirmative action program . . . [or] strikes down a restriction on 
sexually explicit speech.”32 
Our primary level of observation will be a single judge in a 
single case. Each federal appellate panel has three judges, so each 
case appears three times in the dataset—i.e., once for each judge 
—and includes that judge’s vote as well as the panel’s vote. Cases 
are divided into small case categories by subject matter, as shown 
in Table 1. We gather these specific case categories into three 
broader categories: moral values cases, rights cases, and corporate 
or other cases. Moral values cases include those concerning 
abortion, constitutional and statutory challenges to obscenity 
rulings, gay and lesbian rights, and capital punishment. Individual 
rights cases include those concerning affirmative action, the 
 
 28. See RON MALEGA & THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., NCJ 242850, 
SPECIAL REPORT: STATE COURT ORGANIZATION, 2011 (2013). 
 29. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3. 
 30. Id. at 156–63 (providing a detailed explanation of the creation of the dataset and 
the categorization of cases into these categories). 
 31. See id. at 18–19 (“Our methods for finding and assessing these cases . . . leave room 
for errors and sometimes for a degree of discretion. We are confident, however, that we have 
accurately identified the basic patterns of judicial votes.”). 
 32. Id. at 19. 
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Americans with Disabilities Act, First Amendment challenges 
regarding commercial advertising, sex discrimination and 
harassment, and racial discrimination. The cases grouped into the 
remaining corporate or other category are listed in Table 1. Like the 
coding of cases as liberal or conservative, the classification of cases 
into these categories involves subjective judgment and may leave 
room for occasional disagreement. Nevertheless, we believe that 
our categorizations are broadly accurate and provide a useful basis 
for measuring ideological influence. 
B. Overview of Case Data 
Table 1 below shows a summary of the cases in our dataset. We 
have a total of 3880 cases, of which 11% are moral values cases, 62% 
are individual rights cases, and 27% are corporate or other cases. 
Overall, in approximately half of the cases the panel came to a 
liberal decision, but that percentage varies markedly across the 
categories, from the lower end of 36% liberal decisions in moral 
values cases and 41% in individual rights cases to the higher end of 
69% in corporate or other cases. 
We also see substantial heterogeneity within these groupings. 
Of most interest is the heterogeneity within the moral values 
category—about 65% of abortion cases resulted in a liberal decision, 
while the percentage for the other moral values categories were 
relatively consistent at around 28%. Lastly, we note that even with 
nearly 4000 cases, we still have relatively small numbers in some of 
these more specific case categories that are of particular interest. 
This will constrain our ability to test subtle hypotheses about 
judicial behavior, ideology, and religion.  
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C. Judge Data 
Our data on federal appellate judges is compiled from multiple 
publicly available sources. The primary source is the Multi-User 
Database on the Attributes of U.S. Appeals Court Judges, compiled by 
Gary Zuk, Deborah Barrow, and Gerard Gryski of Auburn 
University.33 Additional biographical information is drawn from 
the Federal Judicial Center’s Biographical Directory of Article III 
Federal Judges.34 
We pay particular attention to measuring the religion and 
political ideology of the judges. For religion, we use measures from 
the Auburn database and supplement with additional information 
on religious identification from Gregory Sisk and Michael Heise.35 
We employ four broad religion categories: Protestant, Catholic, and 
Jewish, with a fourth category encompassing other religious 
identities or judges who are nonreligious. While somewhat more 
detailed information is available on religion, the sample sizes in any 
 
 33. Gary Zuk, Deborah J. Barrow & Gerard S. Gryski, Multi-User Database on the 
Attributes of United States Appeals Court Judges, 1801–2000, NAT’L ARCHIVE CRIM. JUST. DATA 
(Feb. 3, 2009), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR06796.v2. We also rely on a separate dataset 
compiled by Zuk et al. to provide information for district court judges who may be sitting 
by designation in a particular case. See Gary Zuk, Deborah J. Barrow & Gerard S. Gryski, 
Multi-User Database on the Attributes of United States District Court Judges, 1801–2000, NAT’L 
ARCHIVE CRIM. JUST. DATA (Feb. 3, 2009), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR04553.v1. 
 34. Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789–Present, FED. JUD. CTR., 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/search/advanced-search (last visited Feb. 19, 2019). 
 35. Sisk and Heise have made their data set available at http://courseweb.stthomas 
.edu/gcsisk/religion.study.data/cover.html. See Sisk & Heise, supra note 6, at 1201 n.*. As 
Professors Sisk and Heise explain, the religious identification data is based on “biographical 
information and confirmation records for indications of religious affiliation, including 
memberships, speeches, and writings. Thus, a judge coded as having no religious affiliation 
is . . . someone who apparently has not belonged to or been active with any religious 
organization.” Sisk & Heise, supra note 6, at 1241. We consulted similar sources of 
information to supply a religious identification value for a very small number of additional 
judges who were not identified in either the Auburn or Sisk and Heise data sets. For example, 
we categorized Judge Roger L. Gregory as “Protestant” based on biographical information 
that appears on the University of Virginia School of Law News & Media website, and 
categorized Judge Patricia M. Wald as “Catholic” based on information that appears in a New 
York Times article. See Michael Marshall, Faith in Law Key to Black Struggle, Gregory Says, U. 
VA. SCH. L. (Feb. 21, 2003), https://www.law.virginia.edu/news/2003_spr/gregory.htm; 
Linda Greenhouse, Public Lives: War Crimes Tribunal Appeals to Unconventional Judge, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 12, 1999), https://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/12/us/public-lives-war-crimes-
tribunal-appeals-to-unconventional-judge.html. 
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one cell become small enough that it is generally not feasible for us 
to divide the religious groups more finely. 
For ideology, we draw upon multiple measures from different 
sources to best represent the breadth of the literature on judicial 
ideology. Our primary measure is the Judicial Common Space 
Score developed by Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal,36 which 
places judges in the same policy space as other political actors.37 
This measure situates a judge in political ideology space by 
proxying his or her ideology with the legislative record of the 
appointing group of politicians (President and home-state Senators 
from the President’s party, if any). We will refer to this measure  
as political ideology based on the legislative record. This is the 
canonical measure in the literature,38 and consequently the  
primary measure of judicial ideology we will employ in our 
empirical analyses. 
The second measure we employ, developed by Adam Bonica 
and Maya Sen, applies a similar “common space” methodology but 
uses the political leaning of campaign finance contributions by the 
judges themselves to place the judge in political ideology space.39 
We will refer to this as political ideology based on the campaign 
finance record. We will not use this measure directly in most of the 
analyses discussed in this Article, but all of our empirical results 
are robust to using this campaign finance measure.  
Lastly, we will sparingly use an internal measure developed 
from the case dataset above, which is the share of liberal votes for 
the judge herself in the entire sample period in all case categories. 
 
 36. KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC 
HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING (1997). 
 37. Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad Westerland, The Judicial 
Common Space, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 303, 306 (2007) (“The starting point for our approach is 
the NOMINATE Common Space scores that are the result of a scaling algorithm that takes a 
set of issue scales [and] . . . provides an ideal point . . . in a two-dimensional Downsian issue 
space.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 38. See Sisk & Heise, supra note 6, at 1222 (“Political scientists have come to regard 
Common Space Scores as the state-of-the-art measure for the preferences of US Court of 
Appeals judges.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 39. See Adam Bonica & Maya Sen, A Common-Space Scaling of the American Judiciary and 
Legal Profession, 25 POL. ANALYSIS 114, 115 (2017) (using the judge’s campaign contributions 
to place each individual judge “in a common space with other candidates and organizations 
spanning local, state, and federal politics”). 
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Due to its endogeneity,40 this measure has limited utility, but it 
could be helpful in assessing whether a judge’s ideological stance 
carries over across different categories of cases. 
 
 40. Ideally, a regression is able to establish a causal relationship between independent 
variable X and dependent variable Y only when the independent variable X is exogenous. 
Variable X is exogenous in a model regressing Y on X if variable X is not determined by 
variable Y so that causality only runs in one direction, from X to Y. The ideology measure 
based on legislative record of the appointing group of politicians can reasonably be assumed 
to be credibly exogenous simply because it is temporally prior to the judge’s votes. In other 
words, we do not think that the judge’s liberal vote in a case (our Y variable) affects the 
legislative record of the appointing group of politicians (our X variable), so we are 
reasonably able to ascribe the relationship between X and Y as a causal one from X to Y 
—ideology so measured affects voting behavior. A similar, though somewhat weaker, 
argument can be made for the ideology measure based on campaign finance contributions. 
However, the judge ideology measure based on the judge’s liberal vote share is clearly not 
exogenous precisely because it is based on the judge’s liberal vote share, which is the judge-specific 
average of our Y variable. This endogeneity is partially alleviated by calculating the liberal vote 
share on non moral values cases only and then using this only to predict voting in moral 
values cases, but this strategy is effective only to the extent that a judge’s voting behavior 
(and therefore his apparent ideology) is different across the different categories of cases. 
Therefore, substantial endogeneity concerns remain for the ideology measure based on 
liberal vote share, and this measure will consequently be used only sparingly. For further 
discussion of endogeneity in general, see WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS  242 
–46 (2018). 
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D. Overview of Judge Data 
Table 2 tells us a good deal about the judges in our dataset.41 
We see that they are representative of federal appellate judges, as 
one would expect given that the Sunstein data include all cases 
during an extended time period: their average age is 63, 90% are 
white, and 85% are male. Note that in 7% of the judge-case 
observations, other judges—primarily district court judges—are 
sitting by designation. We do have demographic information for 
 
 41. Averages and shares will be calculated over the sample of case-judge observations, 
i.e., each judge is counted as many times as they appear on a case. 
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many of these other judges, especially if they were subsequently 
elevated to a circuit court. 
 The second panel shows the religious distribution of the judges: 
45% are Protestant, 27% are Catholic, and 16% are Jewish. The final 
panel shows ideology measures. The common space measures 
based on legislative record and campaign finance are scaled so that 
-1 represents pure liberal, 0 is perfect moderate, and +1 represents 
pure conservative. These measures lean slightly conservative, with 
means that are just above 0. Our new measure based on each 
judge’s voting history is rescaled similarly so that -1 represents 
100% liberal votes and +1 represents 100% conservative votes. The 
ideology measures exhibit substantial heterogeneity, as indicated 
by the standard errors in the table and the fact that the interquartile 
ranges for the three measures are 0.71, 0.65, and 0.38 respectively. 
We also see that 60% of the judges sitting on these cases are 
affiliated with the Republican Party. 
Figure 1 below shows the relationships among the ideology 
variables via a matrix of two-way scatterplots. While the three 
ideology measures are all somewhat different in design, there are 
clearly strong relationships between them: each measure is 
positively correlated with the other two, indicating that they are to 
some extent measuring some common ideological core. At the same 
time, these measures are clearly not interchangeable: the pairwise 
correlations are far from perfect, indicating that each one is 
providing some different information. 
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III. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
A. The Value of Observation 
Our aim in this Article is to understand patterns of behavior 
among judges sitting on federal appellate cases. It is important to 
note that, beyond understanding, we also aim to explain these 
patterns, and we do so by drawing upon the tools of applied 
microeconomic analysis to complement traditional legal analysis. 
But unlike most applied microeconomic analyses, our goal is to 
explain by describing and understanding the patterns rather than 
definitively validating a specific causal and mechanistic 
explanation. Since establishing causality is usually so central to the 
applied microeconomist’s endeavor, this distinction in goals and 
methods merits some discussion. 
Why do applied microeconomists usually aim to establish 
causality? We do so because we want to be able to make “if-then” 
statements, so that we know that if X happens, then Y will follow. 
In the current investigation, however, we want to understand the 
patterns in these data, to understand the behavioral patterns of 
federal judges. We are not seeking to make statements about a 
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possible world, but rather statements about the actual true world. 
In addition to testing causal relationships, econometrics provides 
us powerful tools for making sense of data, for observing in a 
sophisticated and scientific manner. 
Using econometric strategies to map out the relationships 
between a judge’s characteristics and her jurisprudential behavior 
does teach us something important about how different judges 
behave. It is, however, observational, correlational, and not 
necessarily causal. We can say that younger judges tend to do this, 
and Catholic judges tend to do that. Those statements are 
observations—systematic technical observations rather than casual 
observations, but still observations. Putting a number of such 
observations together carefully and systematically, we can produce 
an empirical picture of actual judicial behavior. We can then 
compare that empirical picture with a theoretical picture to see if 
the two are aligned. In this way, we are testing the validity of a 
theoretical model by comparing it to the empirical reality. That is 
what we do in this Article. 
B. A Model of Judicial Decision-Making 
We employ a simple model of judicial decision-making in 
which a judge’s characteristics—demographics, political ideology, 
religion—influence his or her vote in a case. It is well established in 
the literature that the characteristics of a judge and the 
characteristics of the panel can affect the outcome of a federal 
appellate case. Sunstein and his coauthors provide compelling 
evidence that a judge’s vote is influenced by the political party of 
the president who appointed them, and that a judge’s  
ideological tendency is dampened or amplified when in the 
ideological minority or majority.42 Other scholars have reported 
similar findings.43 
In this Article, we restrict our focus to the effects of a judge’s 
individual characteristics rather than the effects of the panel’s 
characteristics. This is primarily due to practical limitations in the 
data. If a sample is split relatively evenly between two groups (e.g., 
Democrats and Republicans), random grouping of judges into 
 
 42. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 8–9. 
 43. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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panels will produce a range of panel compositions, with anywhere 
from 0 to 3 judges of each party affiliation. In our case, the sample 
is not split evenly, and it is split among four groups: 45% are 
Protestant, 27% are Catholic, 16% are Jewish, and 12% are identified 
as “other” or nonreligious. Even a sample of cases with nearly 4000 
decisions will likely not generate enough combinations of different 
panel compositions with different case categories.44 This means that 
we simply do not have sufficient statistical power to test complex 
hypotheses about the role of panel religious composition in 
different categories of cases. 
Our model of judicial decision-making, therefore, assumes that 
judges’ decisions are based on the case in front of them and are also 
influenced by their personal characteristics, with particular 
attention to their political ideology and religious identity. We 
formalize this model below. 
C. Empirical Strategy 
We analyze a set of federal appellate cases and aim to establish 
the relationship between a judge’s characteristics and his or her 
vote in a particular case. Our contribution to the growing literature 
on judicial behavior is to pay particularly close attention to the 
interacting roles of political ideology and religious identity. Hence, 
our baseline specification investigates how political ideology and 
religious identity predict the likelihood of a liberal vote, as follows: 
Equation 1 𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒+, = 	𝛼0 	+	𝛼2𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦, 	+	𝜌2	𝐶𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐, 	+	𝜌;	𝐽𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑠ℎ,+	𝜌?	𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛, 	+		𝑿,	𝜷	 +	𝒀+	𝝁	 +	𝜀+,	. 
In this specification, the coefficient 𝛼2 represents the effect of 
political ideology on the likelihood of a liberal vote. Our hypothesis 
is that 𝛼2 will be negative: as a judge’s political ideology becomes 
 
 44. A panel composed of three judges of four different religious identities can be 
composed in twenty different ways, calculated as a combination with replacement: 
 𝐶I(4,3) = (OP?Q2)!?!(OQ2)! = 20. With uneven probabilities of the different religions, the probabilities 
of getting a panel with two or more judges of each religious group are, respectively, 23%, 
6%, 2%, and 2% for Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and Other. The cell sizes would need to be 
at least an order of magnitude larger to enable sufficient statistical power to test for panel 
religion effects. 
006.REYES_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/19  9:54 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
312 
more positive—i.e., more conservative—the likelihood that she 
enters a liberal vote declines. Similarly, the 𝜌 coefficients represent 
the effect of each religious identity on the likelihood of a political 
vote. For example, if 𝜌; is positive and statistically significant, that 
indicates that a Jewish judge is more likely to enter a liberal vote 
relative to a Protestant judge (the omitted category). The final 
components of the equation include a vector 𝑋, of judge 
characteristics including sex, race, age, and years on the bench and 
a vector 𝑌+ of case characteristics including indicator variables for 
the decade of the case, the appeals circuit, and, in some 
specifications, the specific case category. Here, judges are indexed 
by 𝑗 and cases are indexed by	𝑐. The primary specification is 
ordinary least squares (a linear probability model), though all 
results are robust to running probit.45 Standard errors are clustered 
at the case level. 
 Because we are particularly interested in the interactions 
between political ideology and religious identity, we augment this 
specification by adding these interactions: 
Equation 2 𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒+, = 	𝛼0 	+	𝛼2𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦, 																																													+	𝜌2	𝐶𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐, 	+	𝜌;	𝐽𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑠ℎ, 	+	𝜌?	𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛, 	+	𝜃2	𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦, 	× 	𝐶𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐, 																																														+	𝜃;	𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦, 	× 	𝐽𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑠ℎ, 																																																	+	𝜃?	𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦, 	× 	𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛, 																																	+		𝑿,	𝜷	 +	𝒀+	𝝁	 +	𝜀+,		.	 
In this specification, the 𝜃 coefficients represent the religion-specific 
effect of political ideology on the likelihood of a liberal vote. This 
means that the full effect of ideology for a member of a religious 
 
 45. While a linear probability model often yields reasonably precise and accurate 
results, a probit is the econometrically appropriate specification for a binary outcome 
variable. The probit model allows for an underlying mathematical structure in which the 
independent variables (religion, ideology, etc.) affect a latent propensity to vote liberally, 
and subsequently a liberal vote arises if that latent propensity exceeds a certain threshold. 
Probit models can, however, be more difficult to interpret (see infra note 58), so the researcher 
must navigate a tradeoff between appropriateness and interpretability. We accomplish this 
by reporting the results from linear probability models throughout the Article and then 
providing evidence that the results from the corresponding probit model are qualitatively 
and quantitatively similar. For further discussion of probit in general. See GREEN, supra note 
40, at 728–36, 740–41. 
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group is the sum of 𝛼2 and the 𝜃 for that group. Once again, 
Protestant is the omitted religion category. This specification will 
be run for the entire set of cases, and also for the large categories 
(moral values, rights, or corporate/other) and in some cases for 
small case categories (abortion, first amendment, etc.). The primary 
ideology measure we will use throughout is judge ideology  
based on the legislative record of the appointing politicians, and we 
will also provide evidence on robustness to using alternate 
ideology measures. 
D. A Visual Methodology 
As we proceed through these successive levels of inquiry, our 
understanding of judicial decision-making will become 
increasingly complex. It is apparent that, if we are to understand 
the roles of ideology and religion in judicial decision-making, we 
need to account for the independent and interacting effects of a 
number of factors simultaneously: judge characteristics, ideology, 
religion, as well as characteristics of the case. While one can do this 
efficiently via regression analysis, the results can become so 
intricate as to be nearly impenetrable. Since a complex model 
appears to be the correct model for the empirical structure we are 
observing, we proceed by running these fully saturated regressions 
to maintain the necessary complexity, while displaying the results 
in figures rather than in tables for maximum clarity. 
In the interest of orienting the reader who might be less familiar 
with graphical exposition of regression results, we would like to 
turn our attention to Figure 2, which is an example of the type of 
graph we will be using to understand our primary results. The 
graph shows the predicted likelihood of liberal vote for judges of 
various combinations of religion and ideology, based on regression 
analysis following Equation 2. The title shows us that this analysis 
has been done on the sample of moral values cases only. The 
horizontal axis shows judge ideology, ranging from liberal (-1) to 
conservative (+1), and in this case ideology is measured by the 
campaign finance contributions of the judge. Each bold line with 
shapes represents the prediction for a different religious group, 
distinguished by the shapes and colors shown in the legend. The 
thin dashed lines in matching colors represent statistical confidence 
intervals around these predictions. The wide flat line shows, for 
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reference purposes, the average likelihood of a liberal vote in the 
entire sample being analyzed (in this case the average likelihood is 
just shy of 0.4, or 40%). 
How do we use a graph like this to understand judicial 
behavior? We want to pay attention to the location of each line in 
vertical space: a high position indicates a higher likelihood of a 
liberal vote for a judge in that religious group. We also want to pay 
attention to the slope of each line as we move across: a steep slope 
indicates a larger role for ideology in the likelihood of a liberal vote 
for a judge in that religious group. 
Keeping this in mind, let us walk through the graph. Consider 
the green line with triangles, representing Jewish judges. This line 
is overall much higher than the others, particularly on the liberal 
(left) side of the graph. Among judges with similarly liberal 
political ideology, the Jewish judges are much more likely to lean 
liberal in moral values cases. 
The interaction of ideology and religion is best appreciated by 
looking at the slopes of the lines. Consider the blue line with 
squares, representing Protestant judges. Following this line from 
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left to right, you are starting with the most politically liberal 
Protestant judge and moving to the most politically conservative 
Protestant judge. We see that the line slopes downward, indicating 
that the likelihood of a liberal vote declines as a judge becomes 
more politically conservative (as measured by his campaign finance 
contributions). Next, consider the purple line with circles, 
representing Catholic judges. Following this line from left to right, 
we see that the line is relatively flat, indicating that political 
ideology plays only a small role in determining the likelihood of a 
liberal vote for Catholic judges in these moral values cases. Next, 
consider the Jewish line again (green with triangles). Following this 
line from left to right, we see that the line slopes downward very 
steeply, indicating that political ideology appears to play a larger 
role for Jewish judges. Lastly, we see that judges of other  
religions or those who are nonreligious lean slightly liberal across 
the ideological spectrum but that political ideology plays only a 
small role. 
Putting all of this together, the graph enables us to quickly 
make sense of complex results. We now know that political 
ideology matters in these moral values cases. Moreover, political 
ideology appears to matter quite a lot for Jewish judges, some for 
Protestant judges, and very little for Catholic judges or those of 
other religious identities. We therefore know that religion matters, 
since it seems to mediate the operation of ideology. Not only do the 
lines have different vertical locations indicating a tendency of some 
religious groups to lean more or less liberal, but they have different 
slopes, indicating a different role of ideology within each religious 
group. This visual methodology will be an essential tool for our 
primary inquiry. 
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IV. RESULTS 
A. Surveying the Landscape 
1. Ideology 
We begin by surveying the landscape of judicial ideology and 
its relationship to religious identification. As discussed above, there 
are multiple measures of judicial ideology. To begin, we will 
employ what we regard as the canonical measure, that based on the 
legislative record of the appointing group of politicians. Figure 3 
shows a histogram of this measure of ideology for all of the judges 
in the sample.46 
Judicial ideology by this measure appears bimodal, with the 
distribution showing two humps, one in the liberal (negative) range 
 
 46. Analysis of samples or subsamples of judges is performed on judge-case 
observations. This means that a judge who appears in thirty different cases will be sampled 
thirty times, whereas a judge who appears in only a single case (perhaps a district judge 
sitting by designation) will be sampled just once. Given that the regression analysis will be 
performed on the sample of judge-case observations, this is the appropriate strategy for 
assessing the distribution and co-distribution of judicial characteristics for the sample of 
judges whose decisions will be analyzed. 
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from about -0.5 to 0.0, and one in the conservative (positive) range 
from 0.0 to 0.7. Ideology is also somewhat right-leaning, with a 
greater portion of the observations in the positive range, as 
reflected in the means for this and other ideology measures shown 
in Table 1. Lastly, we see that political ideology rarely extends 
beyond the range of -0.5 to +0.5. In the analysis to follow, we will 
use these two ideology locations as our benchmark political liberal 
and political conservative. 
2. Ideology and religion 
Figure 4 below shows this distribution separately for the 
primary religion categories. We see that the distribution for 
Protestant judges is bimodal with a slight conservative lean (group 
mean of +0.14). This distribution looks quite similar to the 
distribution for all judges—hardly a surprising occurrence given 
that nearly half of judges are Protestant. Catholic judges appear to 
lean a bit more liberal, with more balanced shares to the right and 
the left, and a group mean of 0.03. Jewish judges display a more 
uneven distribution, with a trimodal distribution that shows 
concentrations in very liberal, mildly conservative, and very 
conservative areas, ultimately yielding a middling group mean of 
0.08. Lastly, judges who identify with other religions or as 
nonreligious (not shown) lean more liberal, with a mean of -0.09. 
The most important takeaway here is that a judge’s ideology 
and religion do not appear to be tightly related. While a naïve 
hypothesis might be that religion could possibly be a decent 
predictor of ideology, that hypothesis is false. To a great degree, 
judicial ideology—at least by this measure—is reasonably 
independent of religion. If our aim is to understand the roles of 
ideology and religion in judicial decision-making—both the 
independent roles and their potential interactions—such 
independence is a necessary condition to perform the econometric 
analysis. In sum, we do know that Protestant judges lean slightly 
more conservative and that the distribution for Jewish judges is 
trimodal, but more importantly we know that, for the most part, 
each religion spans the ideology distribution. 
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3. Ideology and voting 
Given the extensive discussions in the literature regarding 
various ideological measures, it is helpful to examine the 
relationships among these ideological measures and also their 
relationships to religious identity. Figure 5 plots the share of liberal 
votes against political ideology as measured by the legislative 
record of the appointing group of politicians. Judges affiliated as 
Democrats are shown as blue circles, while judges affiliated as 
Republicans are shown as red circles. We see that political ideology 
does appear to be tightly connected to party affiliation (nearly all of 
the Democrats are on the left while nearly all of the Republicans are 
on the right). We also see that there is heterogeneity within parties 
in share of liberal votes and political ideology, and that political 
ideology and party are both somewhat predictive of voting 
patterns. Lastly, this graph reinforces our sense that party 
affiliation is nowhere near a perfect predictor of voting patterns: 
there is a great deal of variation around the regression lines. 
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4. Case types and voting 
We saw earlier (in Table 1), that the share of liberal votes is also 
quite heterogeneous across substantive areas. We can gain more 
insight into this variation by plotting histograms of the judge-
category-specific share of liberal votes, which we do in Figure 6. 
This shows, for example, that more than 20 judges in the sample 
ruled conservatively on all of the moral values cases they saw, 
while 12 of the judges ruled liberally on all of the moral values cases 
they saw. In general, we see that the distributions for rights cases 
(yellow) and corporate or other cases (blue) are approximately 
normal distributions (bell curves), with the rights distribution 
shifted to the left and the corporate/other distribution shifted to the 
right. On the other hand, we see that the judges’ voting patterns on 
the moral values cases (red) are spread much more widely 
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throughout the entire range from 0 to 1, with substantial mass at 
the extremes.47 
We noted earlier that nominees to the federal bench often 
downplay the role of extra-legal influences in judging. Chief Justice 
Roberts likened judges to umpires whose task is not to make rules 
but to apply them.48 For her part, Justice Elena Kagan indicated that 
judicial decision-making was not about empathy or what was in a 
judge’s heart, but about what the law requires.49 The distributions 
in Figure 6 call these characterizations into question. If judges were 
simply applying rules and laws and not relying on any other 
influences, it is unlikely that we would see such substantial cross-
judge heterogeneity in share of liberal votes. But we do see this 
heterogeneity in moral values cases in particular, indicating that 
when faced with moral questions judges are judging differently 
from each other in ways that are judge-specific, suggesting that 
they might be consulting something else other than “the law books” 
alone.50 Whether that something else includes religious beliefs and 
values remains to be determined by the analysis below. 
  
 
 47. Note that these histograms are overlaid and semitransparent so that combinations 
of the primary colors (red, yellow, blue) indicate overlapping bars for those colors. For 
example, the orange and yellow bars at 0.20 indicate that 7 judges voted liberally in 20% of 
the rights cases they heard (the yellow bar extends up to 7), while 5 judges voted liberally in 
20% of the moral values cases they heard (red + yellow = orange, so the red bar extends up 
to 5). 
 48. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of 
the United States, supra note 22, at 31. 
 49. See The Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, supra note 24, at 103. 
 50. Cf. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of 
the United States, supra note 22, at 227. 
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  Notes: Regression of liberal vote on judge and case characteristics following 
Equation 1 as described in the text, successively building the specification in the 
manner indicated at the top of each column. Ideology measure is based on the 
legislative record of the appointing group of politicians. Standard errors are  
shown in parentheses. Significance is indicated by ** for p-value < 0.05 and * for p-
value < 0.10. 
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B. Preliminary Investigation of Judicial Decisions 
We now proceed to analyze the determinants of judicial 
decisions. To do so, we will employ measures of judge religion and 
judge ideology as described above, specifically using the common 
space measure of judicial ideology based on the legislative record 
of the appointing politicians. Table 3 shows the results of our 
running Equation 1, our baseline specification, on the sample of all 
cases and all judges. The first column includes only basic judge 
characteristics (sex, race, age, years on the bench) and fixed effects 
(decade, appeals circuit).51 Subsequent columns add ideology and 
religion, with column 2 including ideology only, column 3 
including religion only, and column 4 including both. Because this 
is a linear probability model, the coefficients can be interpreted as 
the effect of a characteristic, such as being female, on the likelihood 
of entering a liberal vote. We see that female judges are 5 
percentage points more likely to decide a case in a liberal direction, 
while white judges are 5 percentage points less likely to decide a 
case in a liberal direction. 
Column 2 shows that judge ideology (as measured by the 
legislative record of appointing politicians) does appear to predict 
judicial decisions, with a one-point increase in judicial ideology 
reducing likelihood of a liberal vote by 14 percentage points. 
Recalling Figure 1 and the distribution of ideology, this means that, 
comparing a judge at the conservative end of the distribution 
(ideology of 0.5) with a judge at the liberal end (ideology of -0.5), 
the likelihood of a liberal vote declines by 14 percentage points. 
Given that about 48% of judge votes in the sample are liberal, this 
is a substantial movement of nearly one-third of the mean. Hence, 
consistent with the literature, we find that ideology’s influence on 
judicial decisions is significant, both statistically and practically. 
On the other hand, column 3 shows that religion, at least by 
itself, does not appear to be an important determinant of judicial 
decisions. The coefficients on each religious group (Catholic, 
Jewish, or Other, with Protestant as the omitted base category) are 
 
 51. Only the coefficients of interest are shown in the table; fixed effects and coefficients 
for age and years on the bench are omitted for clarity. 
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all small and statistically insignificant. Moreover, including both 
religion and ideology together in column 4 reveals little new 
information: the coefficient on ideology is identical to that in 
column 2, the coefficients on the religion indicator variables 52 have 
changed slightly but insignificantly from those in column 3, and the 
adjusted R-squared is virtually identical to that in column 2. 
C. Different Case Types 
Even if religion does not play a significant role across the broad 
range of cases under analysis, might it matter more in a subset of 
cases? Table 4 allows us to delve a bit deeper into this question by 
looking separately at cases we have categorized as moral values 
cases and comparing them to other cases. As noted previously, the 
moral values category is comprised of cases involving abortion, 
capital punishment, gay and lesbian rights, and obscenity. We have 
focused on these kinds of cases because of the frequency with 
which they are cast in religious and moral terms in public 
discourse. The results in Table 4 reveal that everything we have 
been considering—sex, race, ideology, religion—matters more in 
these very cases. 
 
 52. An indicator or dummy variable indicates the presence or absence of the 
characteristic, taking a value of 1 if the characteristic is present (e.g., the judge is Catholic) or 
a value of 0 if the characteristic is absent (e.g., the judge is not Catholic). 
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Notes: Regression of liberal vote on judge and case characteristics following 
Equation 1 for the large case category shown at the top of the column. Ideology 
measure is based on the legislative record of the appointing group of politicians. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Significance is indicated by ** for 
p-value < 0.05 and * for p-value < 0.10. 
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Notably, ideology matters slightly more in moral values cases 
compared to other cases: the main effect of ideology is a decline of 
17 percentage points, rather than 14. Even more interestingly, we 
now see some separation between the coefficients for the different 
religion categories: Jewish judges are 10 percentage points more 
likely to make a liberal decision than Protestant judges, while 
Catholic judges are 5 percentage points less likely to do so (though 
this last result is not statistically significant).53 In the non moral 
values category of cases, ideology matters but religion is not 
particularly important. So what accounts for the difference? If 
judges are behaving differently in moral values cases, what we 
would like to do is parse out what is influencing their behavior 
—political ideology, religion, other moral/conscience 
frameworks,54 or some combination. The fact that columns 2 and 3 
look different—that religion matters in moral values cases but not 
in others—suggests that religion is indeed guiding the decision-
making of at least some judges in cases in which fundamental moral 
values are under consideration. 
D. Interactions Among Ideology, Religion, and Case Type 
To fully understand judicial behavior in this context, we need 
to be able to simultaneously examine the effects of and interactions 
among religion, ideology, and case category. We do this by running 
the fully saturated regression specification shown in Equation 2 and 
interpreting it using the visual methodology described in 
section III.D. Figure 7 employs the visual methodology to 
investigate the roles of ideology and religion in different large case 
categories: all case types in panel A, moral values cases in panel B, 
and not moral values cases in panel C.55 
 
 
 53. The p-value for this coefficient is 0.19, meaning we can reject the null hypothesis 
that this coefficient equals zero with 81% confidence. 
 54. For discussion of the distinction between religious and secular claims of 
conscience, see René Reyes, Common Cause in the Culture Wars?, 27 J.L. & RELIGION 231 (2011); 
René Reyes, The Fading Free Exercise Clause, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 725 (2011). 
 55. The ideology measure here is the measure we have used for most of our analysis 
so far, the legislative record of appointing politicians. 
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Consider panel A, representing results for all case types. All 
judges show similar relationships between ideology and decision-
making. There are some small but insignificant differences in slope 
and position—Jewish judges show a slightly steeper slope, judges 
of other religious identities are slightly more liberal—but overall 
this is a story of homogeneity. A change in political ideology  
from -0.5 (quite liberal) to +0.5 (quite conservative) yields 
approximately a 12-percentage-point decline in the likelihood of a 
liberal vote. The lines for different religions are so coincident as to 
overlap substantially. 
The results get much more exciting when we look at moral 
values cases in panel B. Here, the slope for Protestant judges is very 
steep, much steeper than it was in the general case categories and 
much steeper than for Catholic judges. At the same time, Catholic 
judges exhibit a mild slope and a very slight tendency to lean 
conservative, with their average likelihood of a liberal vote at 38%. 
While Protestants and Catholics were almost indistinguishable in 
panel A, they are almost completely distinct in panel B. Something 
different is happening in moral values cases for Catholics and 
Protestants, particularly for judges with liberal political ideology. 
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There is also something interesting going on with Jewish 
judges. The slope for Jewish judges is as steep as that of Protestant 
judges, so that for both groups moving from the liberal end (-0.5) to 
the conservative end (0.5) yields a decline of approximately 20 
percentage points in the likelihood of a liberal vote. This does not, 
however, mean that Jewish and Protestant judges vote similarly: 
the Jewish line is shifted up by more than 10 percentage points, 
indicating a much higher likelihood that Jewish judges will  
lean liberal, whatever their political ideology. Judges of other 
religions and nonreligious judges exhibit a slightly sloped line that 
is shifted upwards: they are only mildly ideological, but overall 
relatively liberal. 
Panel C, showing results for all of the cases that are not moral 
values cases, is reminiscent of the more tame results of panel A. 
Political ideology matters across the board, a bit more for some 
religions, a bit less for others. Religion matters very little. It appears 
that the interesting action is largely confined to cases in which 
fundamental moral values are at stake. In those cases, and almost 
exclusively in those cases, both religion and political ideology matter, 
and political ideology matters differently for different religious 
groups. 
To better understand these dynamics, let us consider an 
alternate description of how the results for moral values cases in 
Figure 7B differ from the results for non moral values cases in Figure 
7C. Focusing specifically on Protestants and Catholics, we observe 
that the separation of Protestants and Catholics—from almost 
identical in non moral values cases to quite different in moral 
values cases—arises out of the combination of two movements. 
One movement is that the Protestant line becomes steeper, 
primarily by a movement downward of the conservative (right) 
end. At the same time, the Catholic line becomes flatter, primarily 
by a movement downward of the liberal (left) end, and the entire 
line moves down. 
This suggests several imperfect distillations of what we have 
learned so far about patterns of jurisprudence in moral values cases 
as revealed in our data: 
(a) Protestant judges have tended to vote in accordance with 
their political ideology, while Catholic judges have tended 
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to vote relatively more conservatively regardless of their 
political ideology. 
(b) Liberal Jewish judges have tended to vote most liberally. 
(c) Conservative Protestant judges have tended to vote most 
conservatively. 
E. Narrowing the Focus Further 
We can deepen this analysis by breaking the cases out into three 
rather than two large categories: moral values cases, rights cases, 
and corporate or other cases. We do this in Figure 8. In moral values 
cases, we again see steep slopes for Protestant judges and Jewish 
judges, flatter slopes for Catholic judges and those of other religious 
identities. With different slopes and different placements for the 
different religions, religion seems to matter a good deal in cases in 
which fundamental moral values are at issue—abortion, 
homosexuality, obscenity, and capital punishment. 
 
At the same time, in rights cases—affirmative action, ADA, sex 
discrimination, Title VII, and the First Amendment—we see closer 
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placements and slopes. These cases are less ideological, but 
ideology still matters. Protestant and Catholic judges are almost 
identical for these cases, with a moderate slope, while Jewish judges 
and judges of other religious identities are almost identical with a 
slightly steeper slope. 
Comparison between the moral values and rights cases 
suggests that the divergence between Catholics and Protestants 
arises for moral values cases per se, in which Catholics are 
relatively flatter and shifted down.56 This is a notable result. 
Scholars have offered differing interpretations about the extent to 
which Catholic teaching calls upon judges to seek conformity 
between moral law and civil law,57 but our empirical results 
indicate that Catholic judges are behaving differently in moral 
values cases. Panel A shows that in such cases, even Catholic judges 
who are otherwise liberal appear to substantially moderate those 
liberal leanings and vote relatively conservatively, often more 
conservatively than many ideologically conservative judges of 
Jewish or other religious identities. At the same time, panel B 
provides evidence rejecting the hypothesis that this is a broader 
difference—i.e., that Catholic judges are simply more conservative 
across the board. Panel B shows clearly that this behavior is specific 
to moral values cases per se and is not evident in cases concerning 
individual rights. In such cases, the voting behavior of Protestant 
and Catholic judges is almost identical. We also see a closing of the 
gap between Jewish judges and judges with other religious 
identities, but this is accomplished mostly by a steepening for the 
latter and a slight vertical shift for the former.  
Lastly, panel C shows that religion and ideology are least 
important in cases that we have classified as corporate and other. 
Ideology matters some but not a great deal: the gap between 
conservative and liberal is only 10 percentage points, on a very high 
mean of 69% liberal votes. Religion matters very little, with only 
Jewish judges distinguished as very slightly less likely to lean 
liberal. 
 
 56. While the confidence intervals are large, the gaps between the lines are large 
enough that they are still generally statistically significant. 
 57. See supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text. 
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F. Robustness and Understanding 
All of the above results are robust to numerous specification 
tests. Crucially, the central results are robust to employing the 
alternate ideology measure based on the judge’s campaign finance 
contributions. As seen in Figure 2 (which was used as the example 
for our visual methodology), the results for moral values cases are 
qualitatively similar but somewhat amplified using this measure. 
In Figure 2, we see a more substantial flattening of the line for 
Catholic judges and an even larger steepening of the line for Jewish 
judges. Given that this measure is more closely based on the  
judge’s own political leanings—rather than those of his or her 
nominators —it may not be surprising that the effects of ideology 
are slightly amplified. 
The results are also largely unchanged when including fixed 
effects for individual case categories (the seventeen categories 
listed in Table 1) or when including the few additional available 
cases from the 1970s. A particularly ambitious robustness test is to 
include fixed effects for each individual case (one for each of the 3000+ 
individual cases). This enables identification off of within-case 
variation only, and yields empirical results which are qualitatively 
similar but somewhat attenuated, as would be expected with the 
inclusion of so many fixed effects.  
The most interesting robustness test is running the entire 
analysis using a probit specification rather than a linear probability 
model. A probit is the econometrically appropriate specification for 
a binary outcome variable, allowing for an underlying 
mathematical structure in which the independent variables 
(religion, ideology, etc.) affect a latent propensity to vote liberally, 
and subsequently a liberal vote arises if that latent propensity 
exceeds a certain threshold. These results are, again, qualitatively 
similar, but probably more accurate in estimating the exact size of 
each effect. They are shown in Table 5 and Figure 9. 
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  Notes: Probit regression of liberal vote on judge and case characteristics following 
Equation 2 for moral values cases. Marginal effects are shown, evaluated at the 
sample mean for ideology and at the appropriate group mean for each dummy 
variable (i.e., the effect of “Catholic” is estimated with setting the dummy for 
“Catholic” equal to 1 and the dummies for other religions equal to 0). Ideology 
measure is based on the legislative record of the appointing group of politicians. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Significance is indicated by ** for p-value 
< 0.05 and * for p-value < 0.10. 
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Table 5 shows the marginal effects at the means for the probit 
regression for moral values cases.58 We see the greater tendency of 
Catholic judges to vote conservatively in moral values cases 
reflected in the borderline significant -0.07 marginal effect of the 
Catholic dummy variable59 and the dampened ideological behavior 
of Catholic judges to vote conservatively in moral values cases 
reflected in the +0.17 marginal effect of the interaction between the 
Catholic dummy and ideology. The practical significance of these 
is to reduce the likelihood of voting liberally by 7 percentage points 
for all Catholics, and to flatten the slope of liberal vote likelihood 
with respect to ideology from 25 percentage points for Protestants 
to 8 (= 25 – 17) percentage points for Catholics. This is the same shift 
and flattening we saw in the linear probability model and in Figures 
7 and 8. We also see confirmation of the same effects for Jewish 
judges: higher likelihood of liberal votes overall (a 12-percentage-
point main effect) and a slightly steeper slope. 
 
 58. As discussed at note 45 supra, reporting results of a probit regression is more 
complex than simply reporting coefficients and standard errors. While the coefficient on an 
independent variable represents its effect on the latent propensity for a “positive” outcome, 
the marginal effect of an independent variable represents the effect of a one-unit change in 
that variable on the predicted probability of a “positive” outcome. The marginal effect is 
therefore more practically meaningful. However, since one must decide at what independent 
variable values to calculate the marginal effects, the marginal effect is also more complicated 
to report. One common choice is to report the marginal effects at the sample mean of all 
independent variables, but this is not necessarily the correct strategy when the independent 
variables include categorical (dummy) variables. In the present analysis, the marginal effect 
of a dummy variable that is of interest is the change in the probability of a liberal vote that 
results from changing that dummy variable from 0 to 1. We therefore calculate the marginal 
effects of each religion other than Protestant at the margin of shifting from Protestant (our 
base category) to that religion. For each religion, we calculate these for the two extremes of 
ideology (liberal or conservative) and then average the two estimates. We do this both for 
the effects of each religion per se and for the interaction effects of ideology with each religion. 
These are reported in Table 5. We note, however, that marginal effects calculated in this more 
careful manner are not significantly different from the simpler marginal effects calculated at 
the sample mean. See GREENE, supra note 40, at 734–36. 
 59. The t-statistic for the Catholic dummy is 1.58, reflecting a p-value of 0.11. This 
corresponds to an 89% confidence of rejecting the null hypothesis that the effect of  
the Catholic dummy is zero, just shy of the standard 90% confidence threshold for  
statistical significance. 
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 Figure 9 represents these results graphically, plotting the 
predicted liberal vote share for each combination of the four 
religion categories with the two extremes of ideology (liberal at -0.5 
and conservative at +0.5). Comparing liberal and conservative 
Protestant judges, there is a large gap of 25 percentage points in the 
likelihood of voting liberally in moral values cases: 55% for 
ideological liberals versus 30% for ideological conservatives. 
However, this gap is much smaller, only 7 percentage points, for 
Catholic judges: 39% for ideological liberals versus 32% for 
ideological conservatives. Recalling our attention to both position 
and slope, we also note that the Catholic judges are voting more 
conservatively, whatever their political ideology. At a predicted liberal 
vote share of 39%, even ideologically liberal Catholic judges are 
voting more conservatively in moral values cases than ideologically 
conservative Jewish judges, and they are voting quite similarly to 
ideologically conservative Protestant judges.  
 We also confirm that Jewish judges are more liberal overall and 
that their gap is quite large. Further analysis reveals that this 
importance of ideology for Jewish judges in moral values cases is 
primarily driven by the single case category of capital punishment, 
in which Jewish judges appear to be very liberal and very 
ideological. Finally, judges of other religious identities are 
moderate and less ideological, with the smallest gap. 
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V. AN IDENTIFIABLY CATHOLIC JURISPRUDENCE? 
We have now seen that, in cases in which fundamental moral 
values are at stake, and almost exclusively in those cases, both 
religion and ideology matter, and ideology matters differently for 
different religious groups. We have also seen that Catholics in 
particular appear to vote relatively conservatively in moral values 
cases regardless of their political ideology. This raises the question 
of whether Catholic religious ideology may be to some extent 
displacing political ideology in informing jurisprudence when 
fundamental moral values are at issue. 
A notable problem with interpreting the results in this way is 
that Catholic religious teaching is not politically conservative as 
applied to all moral values cases. The issue of capital punishment 
is the most important example. Since 1997, the Catechism of the 
Catholic Church has cast doubt on the death penalty by teaching 
that “cases in which the execution of the offender is an absolute 
necessity ‘are very rare, if not practically nonexistent.’”60 Pope 
Francis has recently revised the text to clarify that “the death 
penalty is inadmissible because it is an attack on the inviolability 
and dignity of the person.”61 The politically liberal nature of this 
church teaching stands in contrast to the politically conservative 
tenor of church teaching on abortion and same-sex marriage. The 
ultimate test of the hypothesis that there exists an identifiably 
Catholic jurisprudential pattern of decision-making would 
therefore be whether the effects are different in the subcategories of 
moral values cases in a manner consistent with Catholic doctrine. 
While our results show a conservative voting trend among Catholic 
judges in moral values cases overall, a “reverse” result in death 
penalty cases would be an important additional piece of evidence. 
Unfortunately, testing this hypothesis appears to be beyond the 
capacity of our data—cutting the cases by religion, ideology, and 
small subcategory substantially reduces statistical power to 
 
 60. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 2267 (2d ed. 1997). 
 61. Gerard O’Connell, Pope Francis Revises Catechism, Teaches that Death Penalty Is 
‘Inadmissible,’ AMERICA (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.americamagazine.org/faith/2018/08 
/02/pope-francis-revises-catechism-teaches-death-penalty-inadmissible. See also Elisabetta 
Povoledo & Laurie Goodstein, Pope Francis Declares Death Penalty Unacceptable in All Cases, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/world/europe/pope 
-death-penalty.html. 
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distinguish among alternate hypotheses. The standard errors and 
confidence intervals get very large, and we are therefore unable to 
either accept or reject the hypothesis of a “Catholic jurisprudence.”  
CONCLUSION 
Interest in the religious identification of federal judges is 
longstanding and enduring. The recent nomination of Brett 
Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court has once again prompted public 
discussion and debate about the relationship between religion and 
judicial decision-making and has even given rise to warnings of 
anti-Catholic bigotry.62 But while the religious commitments of 
judges may generate abiding public attention, the foregoing 
analysis suggests that these commitments may not have nearly as 
much influence on judicial behavior as is sometimes assumed. In 
most of the cases we have studied, religious identification plays 
little if any role in influencing a judge’s jurisprudence. This 
suggests that for most nominees to the federal bench, religious 
affiliation by itself is of minimal value for predicting how they will 
decide the cases that come before them. Political ideology plays an 
important role in nearly all categories of cases, but religion 
generally does not. 
This is not to say that religion has proven to be irrelevant in 
judicial decision-making. To the contrary, we have seen that both 
religious ideology and political ideology matter in moral values 
cases—the very cases that many people care about most deeply. 
These cases give rise to a divergence in behavior between Catholic 
and Protestant judges in which Catholic judges seem to be voting 
relatively conservatively regardless of their political ideology, 
while Protestant judges seem to be voting liberally or 
conservatively in line with their political ideology. We also 
document relatively liberal voting behavior of Jewish judges in 
moral values cases—particularly those involving capital 
 
 62. See, e.g., James S. Robbins, Supreme Court Nominee Brett Kavanaugh Will Face Anti-
Catholic Bigotry—Yes, Bigotry, USA TODAY (July 10, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com 
/story/opinion/2018/07/10/supreme-court-nominee-brett-kavanaugh-trump-anti-catholic 
-bigotry-column/770712002/; Michael S. Rosenwald, Judge Brett Kavanaugh—a Catholic 
—Faces a Historical Struggle Between Canon and Constitutional Law, WASH. POST (July 9, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2018/07/08/catholics-on-the 
-court-the-historic-struggle-between-canon-and-constitutional-law/?noredirect=on&utm 
_term=.6ba46d92e69a. 
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punishment—and relatively nonideological behavior of judges of 
other religious identities. These complex interaction effects of 
religion and political ideology on a judge’s jurisprudence are  
both statistically and practically significant: even politically liberal 
Catholic judges are voting more conservatively in moral values 
cases than politically conservative Jewish judges, and they are 
voting quite similarly to politically conservative Protestant  
judges. The religion of a judge therefore does appear to be 
systematically connected to his or her jurisprudence in at least  
some circumstances. 
The larger and most important implication of our study may 
thus be to confirm that judicial decision-making in the federal 
courts has not simply been an exercise in applying text and 
precedent; it has been a process in which ideology of various kinds 
has sometimes played an important role. This suggests in turn that 
members of the public and of the U.S. Senate should continue to 
raise questions about judicial nominees’ views about contested 
constitutional questions touching upon fundamental rights. To ask 
such questions is not to manifest anti-religious bias, but rather to 
recognize that judging has proven to be a far more ideologically 
complex task than many nominees have suggested. 
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